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JURISDICTION.AL STATEl\1ENT
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G).
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Despite Defendant/Appellant Staci Baker's ('"Defendant") assertion,
Plaintiff/Appellee C504750, LLC ("Plaintiff') does not believe there is a constitutional
provision which is directly relevant or material to this appeal because the sole issue and
scope of appellate review concerns the District Court's August 21, 2015 Order Denying

1'1otion for Relieffrom Default Judgment, which Motion was asserted pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 4 and 60(b)(4).
ISSUE ~~'1) STANDARD OF REVIE\V
Issue: Did the District Court err when it denied Defendant's _Motion for Relief

from, Default Judgnient ("l\iotion to Set A.side"), where the District Court found Plaintiff
exercised reasonable diligence and had good cause to believe the Defendant was avoiding
service, and based thereon, authorized service by publication pursuant to Rule
4(d)(4)(A)?
Standard of Review: A denial of motion to set aside a default judgment is

2enerally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, with the underlying factual
determination of whether a defendant \:\'as served with process reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Crane-Jenkins v. _Mikarose, LLC, 2015 UT App 270, 19. ("A
'district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to set aside an order of judgment
under rule 60(b), and [t]hus, we review a district court's denial of a 60(b) motion under an
1

abuse of discretion standard."') (quoting Utah Res. Int'!, Inc. v. J..1ark Techs. Corp., 2014
UT 60, 'if 11,342 P.3d 779 (alteration in original). If a motion to set aside a default
judgment is brought because the judgment is "void" for lack of process, however, such is
reviewed under a correction-of error standard. Bonneville Billing v. Tf'hatley, 949 P .2d
768, 771 (Utah App. 1997). Importantly, a court can only overturn the factual finding of
proper service if the district court's findings were "without adequate evidentiary support
or induced by an erroneous view of the law."

Tf1estern

Capital & Sec. v. Knudsvig, 768

P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). Further, "[f]indings
of fact are not clearly erroneous unless they are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence." Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Am,es Kraenier, LLC, 2009 UT
7, 'il 11,210 P .3d 263.

STATEl\ffiNT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case and Procedural History. This appeal is from the Utah Fourth
Judicial District Court's July 20, 2015 bench ruling, as confirmed in an August 21, 2015
final Order Denying Motion for Relieffrom Default Judgment. Based on "the pleadings,
papers and evidence filed" and "good cause appearing", the District Court found, inter
alia, that "Defendant has avoided service" and "service by normal means is unreasonable
and impracticable under the circumstances" and denied Defendant's Motion for Relief
from Default Judgment ("Motion to Set Aside").
This case arises out of an action for specific performance relating to Plaintiffs
June 10, 2014 attempted purchase of Defendant's 40% undivided interest in a
2

residential property, which Defendant purchased at a July 31, 2013 tax sale for the
nominal amount of $5,070.07 (i.e., whereby Defendant became a "tax sale interest
purchaser" pursuant to Utah Code AJ.111. § 59-2-1351. 7). Nonvithstanding receipt of a
certified letter from Plaintiffs counsel respecting Plaintiffs June 10, 2014 execution
of a Real Estate Purchase Agreement ("REPC") to purchase the property, Defendant
refused to sell her interest in the property to Plaintiff (i.e., as required by § 59-2135 l. 7) (emphasis added), which mandates that a "tax sale interest purchaser mav not
object to the sale of the tax sale property'' under the facts herein. Defendant also
threatened legal proceedings relating to the property. As a result and on August 28,
2014, Plaintiff filed suit to quiet title to Defendant's interest in the property.
The record is undisputed that Plaintiff thereafter attempted, in good faith, from
September 1, 2014 to September 18, 2014 to serve process on and/or to make contact
with Defendant on multiple occasions and by multiple means. In process server
Matthew Dyches' Declaration of Non-Service, filed with the District Court, he
testified to attempting to personally serve Defendant in September of 2014 on at least
five separate occasions, each on a different day of the week over an 18 day time period
and at a different time of day (i.e., Monday 9/1 at 6:40 p.m., Friday 9/5 at 5: 10 p.m.,
Sunday 9/7 at 8:11 p.m., Tuesday 9/16 at 11:53 a.m. and Thursday 9/18 at 7:36 p.m.).
During several of these attempts, :Mr. Dyches saw people in the house and/or cars in
the driveway, but they ignored him and/or refused to answer the door. He talked to
neighbors on nvo separate occasions and confnmed Defendant resided at the residence.
3

On one occasion, Mr. Dyches left his business card at the door to facilitate a phone or
in-person contact without response from Defendant. Mr. Dyches made visual contact
with at least one person in the residence, who ignored him, and who, only after Mr.
Dyches was driving off, walked out of the residence to get the mail. Thereafter, Mr.
Dyches saw the same man sitting in an office in the residence, the front door of which
was slightly open, and Mr. Dyches yelled to hnn, rang the doorbell and knocked
loudly, though the man continued to ignore and refused to speak with him. After
returning from a neighbor's, whereby he reconfirmed Defendant resided there and as

Mr. Dyches was leaving, he observed that the door had been closed and the blinds to
the office had been pulled shut. Independently, Ms. Staci Robison-Reith, a paralegal
for Plaintiff's counsel, also performed an electronic address search on Defendant,
confirmed the address was current and mailed a certified letter, return receipt
requested, to Plaintiff, which was returned unclaimed. Significantly, "[a]fter careful
inquiry and diligent attempts" and based on ms experience, Mr. Dyches reasonably
concluded Defendant had avoided service and professionally "recommended" that
Plaintiff seek an "alternate method of service." R. 47.
Understandably frustrated by Defendant's avoidance of service and pursuant to
Rule 4(d)(4)(A), Plaintiff requested approval from the District Court to serve
Defendant through publication. On October 1, 2014 and in ordering Plaintiff to
publish notice of the action to Defendant by publication (as also subsequently proven

4

to the District Court thereafter in connection with Defendant's Motion to Set Aside),
the District Court considered Plaintiffs request and specifically found:
I. Defendant has avoided personal service and there are no other means to personally
senre Defendant.
2. The whereabouts of the person to be served are either unknown and cannot be
ascertained through reasonable diligence, or there exists good cause to believe that
the persons to be sen1 ed are avoiding service of process, and service by nom1al
means is unreasonable and impracticable under the circumstances.
_Amended Order Granting Ex Parte !\1otion For Alternative Service By Publication, R.
61-62. Plaintiff complied with the District Court's foregoing directives.
\\'hen Defendant failed to timely file an answer, Plaintiff sought and was
granted a default judgment. Months later, Defendant filed her !\1otion to Set Aside the
default judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4 and 60(b) (effectively under 60(b )(4),
asserting and arguing the default judgment was "void"). On July 20, 2015, a hearing
was held regarding Defendant's Motion to Set Aside. Having carefully reviewed "the
pleadings, papers and evidence filed" in regard thereto and "good cause appearing",
the District Court denied the Motion to Set Aside, from which the appeal was taken.

STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS
1. C161P, LLC was the sole O\\rner of the property located at 161 \V. Pacific Dr.,
American Fork, UT 84003 (the "Property"). (R. 126; R. 2.)
2. An undivided interest in the Property was auctioned off at a tax sale to satisfy past
due property tax obligations, which was impliedly effectuated at a below market value.
See Fact 3, infi~a.
5

3. On/or about July 31, 2013, Defendant purchased a 40% undivided interest as a

"tax sale purchaser" for $5,070.07. (R. 126; R. 2.)
4. C161P, LLC continued to own 60% of the undivided interest and decided to sell
the Property to Plaintiff. (R. 2.)
5. On/or about June 10, 2014, C161P, LLC entered into a REPC. (R. 27-30.)
6. Defendant was intended to be a seller of her 40% interest in the Property under the
REPC (with an associated third party beneficiary interest).
7. On July 25, 2014, Plaintiff's counsel sent Defendant a letter via certified and
regular mail addressed to Staci Baker at 1748 Glendell Drive, Orem, UT 84058. (R. 203704.)
8. This letter stated Plaintiff's counsel was aware that Defendant had "a 40%
undivided interest in the property" and referenced the entry number, and attached the
relevant Tax Deed. The letter infom1ed Defendant "that this property currently has an
offer on it and is under contract for sale" (for which Defendant was a beneficiary). The
letter further stated "as a tax sale interest purchaser, you are entitled to the pro rata share
of the sale price of the property based on your undivided interest in the property in
accordance with section 59-2-1351.7 of the Utah Code." A copy of Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-1351. 7 was attached to the letter. Finally, the letter provided, "[t]herefore, in
compliance with this statute, please attend the closing on this property currently set for
August 1, 2014 at 10 a.m. to sign a quit claim deed for your interest in the property in
exchange for the check for your pro rata share of your interest." The letter established the
6

address and contact information for the closing. (R. 206-220.)
9. On July 31, 2014, Defendant's husband responded to the foregoing letter via
email. The email stated "'I am providing the follO\\ting on behalf of my wife Staci Baker
regarding the tax sale prope1iy at 161 Vv. Pacific Drive in iunerican [F]ork." It
continued, stating that he ·'will not be cooperating vv·ith [Plaintiff] on the proposed sale of
the tax sale home at 161 Pacific Drive in American Fork." The letter finally stated he
•'intend[s] to pursue collection of these lost rents in any legal proceedings that become
necessary. Conduct yourselves accordingly, Staci Baker." (R. 222-223.)
10. After receiving this response and on August 28, 2014~ Plaintiff filed its Complaint
for quiet title. (R. 1-5.)
11. Out of an abundance of caution, although Plaintiff already knew Defendant's
address was correct, Plaintiff's counsel ran an updated internet search to confirm
Defendant's address was current. (R. 050-051.)
12. Further, Plaintiff's counsel drafted and Staci Robison-Reith (paralegal for
Plaintiff's counsel) sent Defendant another letter via certified mail, but \Vas then returned
unclaimed. (Id.)
13. On August 28, 2014, Plaintiff contracted for the independent, professional
services of Mr. Matthew Dyches, an experienced process server, at Court Ops, to serve
the Complaint upon Defendant at Defendant's address according to Plaintiff's kllo,1,/ledge.
(R. 047.)

7

14. On Monday, September 1, 2014 at 6:40 p.m., Mr. Dyches first attempted service
on Defendant at 1748 Glendell Drive, Orem, Utah, 84058 ("Defendant's Residence").
There was no answer. Mr. Dyches confirmed with a neighbor that Defendant lived at the
residence. (Id.)
15. On Friday, September 5, 2014 at 5:10 p.m., Mr. Dyches again attempted service
at Defendant's Residence. He left his business card (i.e., to facilitate a phone or in person
contact). (Id.)
16. On Sunday, September 7, 2014 at 8:11 p.m., Mr. Dyches attempted service a
third time at Defendant's Residence. He saw a note at the residence addressed to
Defendant, which reconfinned it was her address. He also believed he saw someone
through the window as he left. (Id.)
17. On Tuesday, September 16, 2014 at 11 :53 a.m., Mr. Dyches returned again to the
Defendant's Residence to serve her. He saw individuals moving inside the home in
addition to three vehicles at the property. No one answered the door, but as Mr. Dyches
was driving off, he saw a gentleman walk out to get the mail and the gentleman observed

M:r. Dyches drive off. (Id.)
18. Finally, on Thursday, September 18, 2014 at 7:36 p.m., Mr. Dyches again tried to
serve Defendant at Defendant's Residence. The blinds were open and the lights were on
and he could see the same gentleman inside who got the mail on the previous service
attempt. The front door was open a few inches and the blinds to an office next to the
front door were open and the lights were on. Mr. Dyches yelled to the man inside,
8

knocked loudly and rang the doorbell. \Vhile Mr. Dyches could see him sitting in his
office in front of his computer, the man ,vould not respond to Mr. Dyches. Mr. Dyches
then walked to the neighbors on the south side of the home and verified that the
Defendant still lived there. \Vben :Mr. Dyches walked back to Defendant's Residence,
shortly thereafter~ he observed that the front door had been shut all the ,vay and the blinds
to the office had been closed. (Id.)
19. At that time, Mr. Dyches completed his s,vom Declaration of Non-Service,
stating that "[a]fter careful inquiry and diligent attempts", he ,vas "unable to serve"
Defendant, and based on his experience, he independently recommended alternative
service. (Id.)
20. On September 23, 2014 and following the foregoing service attempts over a
period of nearly 3 weeks, Plaintiff filed a Motion for AltematiYe Service by Publication
detailing the various service attempts by :Mr. Dyches and establishing Plaintiff's
reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Defendant. (R. 042-054.)
21. On October 1, 2014, the District Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Alternative
Service and expressly found, inter alia, Defendant "had avoided personal service". The
District Court ordered, inter alia, that Defendant shall be served through publication on
nvo occasions on consecutive ,veeks in a ne,vspaper of general circulation in Utah
County, Utah. (R. 061-062.)
22. In compliance with the District Court's order, Plaintiff published notice in The
Daily Herald, based out of Utah County, Utah, on October 5, and 12, 2014. (R. 065-067.)
9

23. Plaintiff incurred over $200 in costs to serve Defendant through publication.
(Id.)

24. On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Summons with Proof of Publication with
the Court. (Id.)
25. Approximately a month later, on November 12, 2014, the Court Clerk signed a
Praecipe upon Default and Default Certificate of Defendant Staci Baker. (R. 070-071.)
26. On November 26, 2014, the Court entered Default Judgment. (R. 098-100.)
27. On February 24, 2016, Defendant filed her Motion to Set Aside pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 4 and 60(b ), arguing under 60(b )(4) that Defendant was not served, therefore
rendering the judgment void. (R. 121-132.)
28. On July 20, 2015 and following briefing and oral argument, the District Court
issued a bench ruling, stating that
having reviewed the affidavits, rereviewed what I did in the first instance in
authorizing the service by publication. I would do it the same way. I'm
satisfied that based upon the affidavit that was presented to me that there
was sufficient evidence to justify alternative service. The process server
didn't merely knock on the door five times and say nobody is there. He
checked with neighbors, he saw people moving around .... He had to
believe there were people there that were refusing to respond to him.
(R. 0372.) The District Court concluded that service through publication in The Daily
Herald was sufficient under these circumstances. (Id.)
29. On August 21, 2015, the District Court issued its final Order Denying Motion
for Relief from Default Judgment, wherein it found, inter alia, that:

10

1. Defendant has avoided personal service and there are no other means to
personally serve Defendant.

2. The whereabouts of the person to be served are either unknown and cannot be
ascertained through reasonable diligence, or there exists good cause to believe
that the persons to be served are avoiding service of process, and service by
nom1al means is unreasonable and impracticable under the circumstances.
(R. 61-62.)

SUl\1..\1.ARY OF THE ARGUl\fENT
I.

Sections II and III are not properlv before this Court on appeal.

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside and related argument were presented on the basis that
the default judgment was ··void'' for lack of service pursuant to Rule 60(b )( 4 ). As such,
the scope of Defendant's appeal is limited to whether the District Court erred in denying
the :Motion to Set Aside on that basis. Defendant incorrectly attempts to argue, inter alia,
that she is entitled to relief pursuant to the Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b )( 6), which is for "any
other reason that justifies relief." This is a "catch-all" provision that cannot be invoked if
any of the other bases for relief are applicable. Defendant's extraneous arguments
regarding the merits of the underlying default judgment (i.e., attorney's fees and timing)
and the merits of Defendant's alleged defense, if any, thereto should not be considered as
beyond the scope of the appeal. These arguments ,,,ere not preserved and are irrelevant.
II.

The District Court did not err when it denied Defendant's Motion to Set

Aside where it found Plaintiff exercised reasonable diliQence and had 2:ood cause to
believe Defendant was avoiding: service. and authorized service bv publication. Rule
60(b)(4) allows for relief from a judgment where the judgment is shown to be "void",
11

however, "[t]he concept of a void judgment is narrowly construed in the interest of
finality." Brinihall v. Mecham, 494 P.2d 525, 526 (Utah 1972). Significantly, "[w]hether
a defendant was properly served with process is a question of fact, reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard." State ex rel. L.B., 2003 UT App 349 (citing Cooke v. Cooke,
2001 UT App 110, if 7, 22 P.3d 1249) (emphasis added). Plaintiff "diligently" attempted
to serve Defendant at her known residence, through at least five separate service attempts
as referenced in the Facts, supra, and came to believe based on "good cause" that
Defendant was "avoiding service". Only upon Plaintiffs proof of such (by undisputed
and admissible evidence) did the District Court soundly exercise its discretion to allow
Plaintiff to serve Defendant by publication. The District Court neither made clearly
erroneous findings, nor misapplied the law.
III.

Should the Court consider Defendant's alleged meritorious defense,

arguendo. Defendant's arguments are unsupported. Arguendo, Defendant's urged

statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-21351.7. Utah's Partial Interest Tax Purchaser statute mandates that a person who
purchases an undivided interest of less than 49% at a tax sale "may not object" to a
subsequent sale by the majority property owner. See id. Nowhere in the statute does it
provide, expressly or impliedly, that a minority owner can object. Indeed, consistent with
the majority owner's unconditional right to sell the property as and when he/she chooses,
the statute contains an explicit guarantee respecting the return of the tax sale interest
purchaser's interest in specified proceeds of sale from the property. In this case, the
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majority interest owner sold the property and offered Defendant 40% of the purchase
price of the property, ,vhich exceeded the statutorily guaranteed 12% return on her
investment. This satisfied the plain tem1s of statute. Defendant's request that the Court
construe and interpret the statute in a manner that is contrary to the plain and
unambiguous language thereof should be rejected.
The District Courf s denial of Defendanf s Motion to Set Aside should be affinned .

.ARGUl\1ENT
I.

SECTIONS II ~~D III OF DEFENDA~~T'S BRIEF SHOULD BE
DISREGARDED AS THEY RAISE ARGUl\1ENTS THAT \VERE NOT
PRESERVED BELO\V, EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE APPE.A.L ..\i1\"D
ARE IRRELEVANT.
Defendant asserts several arguments which should not be considered on appeal.

\Vhile general reference was made to Rule 60(b ), Defendanf s :Motion to Set Aside and
related argument were presented on the basis that the default judgment was "void" for
lack of service pursuant to Rule 60(b )(4 ). As such, the scope of Defendant's appeal is
limited to whether the District Court erred in denying the :Motion to Set Aside on that
basis (i.e., whether Defendant \\'as properly served). Defendant's extraneous arguments
regarding the merits of the underlying default judgment (i.e. attorney's fees) and the
merits of Defendant's alleged defense, if any, thereto should not be considered as beyond
the scope of the appeal. These arguments were not preserved and are irrelevant.
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A.

Defendant's Appeal is Limited to a Review of the District Court's
Denial of Plaintiff's Rule 60(b )(4) Motion to Set Aside.

This Court has long recognized that the "review of a district court's rule 60(b)
order is 'limited in scope' because such an appeal must only address 'the propriety of the
denial or grant of relief,' not the correctness of the underlying judgment." Bodell Const.

Co. v. Robbins, 2014 UT App 203, iJ 5,334 P.3d 1004 (quoting Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, iJ 19, 2 P.3d 451). See also Express Recove,y
Services v. Davis, 2012 UT App 296, 'if 4,289 P.3d 606; Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT
App 134, 'if 19, 183 P.3d 1052, 1057.
As grounds for her Motion to Set Aside and citing Rules 4 and 60(b), Defendant
specifically asserted, "[d]ue to the lack of diligence by Plaintiff and the lack of notice to
[Defendant], the November 26, 2014 Order is void." R. 122. Consistent therewith,
Defendant similarly reasserted in her supporting memorandum that "[u]nder these
relevant rules and authorities, the Order is void and should be vacated." R. 129. Having
thereby established and preserved only the issue of whether the District Court abused its
discretion in denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside based on the default judgment
being "void" under Rule 60(b)(4), Defendant cannot be heard to raise new arguments on
appeal or to challenge extraneous proceedings below.
Because Defendant's reference to and arguments regarding the merits of the
default judgment, including attorney's fees (Section II of Appellant's Brief), the
interpretation of Utah Code§ 59-2-1351.7 (Partial Interest Tax Sale), and/or relief under
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Rule 60(b )( 6), are improperly asserted and cannot be considered on appeal, such should
be disregarded as beyond the scope of this appeal.

B.

,vhile Defendant's New Arguments Respecting Rule 60(b )(6) Relief
and Extraneous and/or Equitable Considerations ,vere Not Preserved,
Arguendo, Such Are Not a Basis For Relief on Appeal.

Arguendo, in her Brief, Defendant references Rule 60(b)(6) (which considers relief
for "any other reason that justifies relief from the operation of the judgment"),
presumably as a new and additional ground to set aside the default judgment. As the
Court is aware, Rule 60(b) identifies six general categories or reasons for which a party
may seek relief from a judgment. For example, Rule 60(b)(l), (2) and (3) permit relief
by reason of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; and fraud, respectively. Lack of proper service, whereby a court may
determine that a "judgment is void", however, falls under Rule 60(b)(4). See Garcia v.
Garcia, 712 P .2d 288, 290 (Utah 1986) (discussing a judgment being considered void for
fatally defective service of process). Unlike other categories of relief under Rule 60(b),
under Rule 60(b)(4), a district court has no discretion in deciding relief- if there was
adequate service, the court cannot set aside the judgment as void. Tfl"orlanan v. Nagle
Const., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 754 (Utah App. 1990) ("Generally, the district comi has some
discretion in ruling on a rule 60(b) motion. However, if the judgment is detennined to be
void, the court has no discretion, and the judgment must be set aside."). Thus, the court
cannot consider other equitable factors (i.e., timeliness, meritorious defense, etc.) as it
may do under other 60(b) bases for relief as further discussed, infra, in Section I.D.
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Significantly, "Rule 60(b)(6) is the 'catch-all' provision of rule 60(b) ....
Because rule 60(b)( 6) is• meant to operate as a residuary clause, it may not be relied upon
if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule 60(b)." Menzies
v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ~ 71, 150 P.3d 480, 506 (emphasis added) (citing Cnity. Dental
Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002); Russell v. Ji.1artell, 681 P.2d 1193,

1195 (Utah 1984); and Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306--07 (Utah
1982)). "In other words, the grounds for relief under 60(b)(6) are exclusive of the
grounds for relief allowed under other subsections." Id. (citing Russell, 681 P .2d at 119 5;
Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168 & n.8. Of course, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) "should be

'sparingly invoked' and used 'only in unusual and exceptional circumstances."' Id.
(quoting Laub, 657 P .2d at 1307-08; see also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick
Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993) (under Fed. R. Civ.

P 60(b)(6), a party must show "extraordinary circumstances"); Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168
(same)).
While erroneously stating that she moved for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b )( 6)
(Appellant's Brief, p. 15), Defendant clearly requested relief from the judgment because
the judgment was "entered without due process of law [and is] void." See Appellant's
Brief, p. 15. Because relief based on a judgment being "void" only falls under Rule
60(b)(4 ), Defendant's indirect reference to relief under the catchall provision of Rule
60(b)(6) is misplaced. This distinction is of critical importance because the scope of
review under Rule 60(b)(4) is different from the basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), as
16

the court may only consider whether the Defendant was properly served or not. See

Worlonan, supra. Thus, Defendants' other arguments regarding extraneous and/or
equitable considerations or requirements, such as timeliness under Rule 60(b )( 1), (2) or
(3), the mechanics of the tax sale, or any alleged defense Defendant may have, are simply
irrelevant and not properly before the Court, as also further discussed, infra, in Section
I.C and I.D.

C.

Defendant Did Not Preserve Her New Arguments Under Rule 60(b)(6),
Including Regarding Timeliness or Concerning the Existence of a
l\f eritorious Defenses.

As suggested, supra, Defendant's new claim for relief based on Rule 60(b)(6),
various timing considerations and the alleged existence of a meritorious defense under
Rule 60(b)(6) were not timely asserted or preserved in the District Court proceedings.
Utah law is clear that "to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise
the issue in the trial court," because "a t.Iial court must be offered an opportunity to rule
on an issue." O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, if117-18, 217 P.3d 704 (quoting Badger v.

Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). "[I]n order to preserve an issue for
appeal [,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court
has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 l\!ain St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r
51~ 99 P.3d 801 (quoting Brookside A!obile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 'il
14, 48 P.3d 968) (alterations in original). Importantly, when a party "first raise[s an]
issue in his reply memorandum, it [is] not properly before the trial court and ,,,e will not
consider it for the first time on appeal." Stevens v. LaVerldn City, 2008 UT App 129, ~'if
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30-31, 183 P.3d 1059 (quoting State v. Phathanunavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah
App.1993)) (alterations in original).

In Stevens, the appellate court refused to consider a new basis for relief from a
default judgment that the moving party raised for the first time in a reply memorandum.

Id. This Court noted that although there was no motion to strike, the District Court "did
not acknowledge or otherwise address" the new basis, which was raised for the first time
in defendant's reply. Id. at~ 30. Therefore, the new basis was not properly preserved

and could not be reviewed on appeal. Id.
Here, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside simply asserting that the default
judgment was void under Rule 60(b )(4). R. 129-131. Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Set
Aside. R. 191-201. Only thereafter, did Defendant, for the first time, raise new and
additional grounds and factors for relief in her Reply in Support of the Motion for Relief
ji'·om Default Judgnient. R. 228-232. Naturally, Plaintiff moved to strike such new bases

as being improperly raised for the first time on reply. R. 288-89. During oral argument,
Defendant effectively abandoned such other arguments and only argued that the default
judgment was void because of failure of service (i.e., pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)). R. 342373. Thus, the District Court properly denied Defendant's Motion to Set Aside solely on
the question of whether the Defendant was properly served. Defendant's after-the-fact
reference to new additional grounds (i.e., under Rule 60(b )(6), whereby the existence of a
meritorious defense might be a relevant factor) was not considered. As such arguments
were not preserved below, they are not properly before this Court.
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Notably, Defendant has admitted that any arguments regarding an alleged
meritorious defense or the merits of the underlying default judgment were not raised in
the District Court. Defendant acknowledged in her memorandum in support of her
Motion to Set Aside that ··[b ]ecause it is not appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions to
examine the merits of the claim, [Defendant] will reserve briefing all issues that go to the
merits of the claim and award sought by Plaintiff. See also Larsen v. Collina, 684 P .2d
52 (Utah 1984)." R.0131. Though Defendant appears to have changed her position on
this issue for purposes of appeal, the underlying merits of the default judgment (including
awarding attorney' fees) or the existence of an alleged meritorious defense thereto ,;vere
not addressed by or preserved in the District Court and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Thus, these issues and arguments (which make up the entirety of Sections II
and III of the Defendant's brief) should be disregarded by the Court on appeal.
D.

Arguendo, Defendant's Arguments Regarding Timeliness, the Alleged
Existence of a :Meritorious Defense and Any Other Equitable Factors
are Irrelevant and Should Be Disregarded.

While she only argued to the District Comi that the default judgment should be set
aside under Rule 60(b )(4) because it was "void" due to lack of service, on appeal,
Defendant addresses several new and irrelevant questions relating to timing, equitable
factors and the alleged existence of a meritorious defense. Though improper, as argued

supra, Defendant's arguments, arguendo, are contrary to controlling case law.
First, the 3 month filing or timing requirement relating to Rule 60(b )(1 ), (2) and
(3) does not apply to a Rule 60(b )(4) request for relief respecting a "void" judgment due
19

to defective service. Garcia, 712 P .2d at 290 ("where the judgment is void because of a
fatally defective service of process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no
application.").
Second, Utah law is also clear that equitable considerations, such as excusable
neglect, mistake, diligence in defense, and even the existence of a possible meritorious
defense are not relevant to or considered in detennining whether a judgment is void.
Worlanan, 802 P.2d at 754. See also Garcia, 712 P.2d at 290 ("Nor is there any

requirement, as there usually is when default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b)
that the moving party show that he has a meritorious defense."). Thus, this Court should
properly focus on only whether the judgment is void (i.e., or if the judgment is invalid)
without regard to unrelated equitable considerations). As equitable factors are not
relevant or to be considered, Defendant's assertion that she has a statutory defense
relating to the underlying tax sale statue is irrelevant. Accordingly, Section III of the
Appellant's Brief should not be considered on appeal.

II.

AS DETERMINED BY THE DISTRICT COURT, PLAINTIFF WAS
REASONABLY DILIGENT IN ATTEl\1:PTING TO SERVE DEFENDANT
AND HAD GOOD CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFE:NDANT WAS AVOIDING
SERVICE BEFORE OBTAINING APPROVAL TO SERVE DEFENDANT
BY PUBLICATION AS AUTHORIZED UNDER RULE 4.

Rule 60(b)(4) allows for relief from a judgment where the judgment is shown to be
"void", however, "[t]he concept of a void judgment is narrowly construed in the interest
of finality." Brinihall v. A1echam, 494 P.2d 525, 526 (Utah 1972). Specifically, "[a]
judgment is void only if the court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction ... of the parties,
20

or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." Id. Of course, "the
burden of demonstrating a lack of jurisdiction lies on the party challenging jurisdiction."

Jackson Const. Co., Inc.

1~

1,farrs, 2004 UT 89, ,I 9, 100 P.3d 1211. Even when a default

judgment is entered "the law presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the
party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence." Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
Significantly, "[ w ]hether a defendant was properly senred with process is a
question of fact, reviewed under the clearlv erroneous standard." State ex rel. L.B., 2003
UT App 349 (citing Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110,, 7, 22 P.3d 1249) (emphasis
added); Salt Lake City Co,p. v. Jordan River Restoration Netvvork, 2012 UT 84, ,r 47, 299
P.3d 990, 1005299 P.3d 990 ("However, because [these questions require] the application
of facts in the record to the due process standard, we incorporate a clearly erroneous
standard for the necessary subsidiary factual detem,inations.'} 1

1

Significantly, while a denial of motion to set aside as default judgment is generally
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, the underlying factual detern1ination of
whether Defendant was served with process is reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Crane-Jenkins v. Mikarose, LLC, 2015 UT App 270, ,r 9 ("A 'district court has
broad discretion in ruling on a motion to set aside an order of judgment under rule 60(b),
and [t]hus, we review a district court's denial of a 60(b) motion under an abuse of
discretion standard."') (quoting Utah Res. Int'!, Inc. v. lifark Techs. C01p., 2014 UT 60, 1
11, 342 P .3d 779 (alteration in original). If a motion to set aside a default judgment is
brought because the judgment is void for lack of process, such is revie,:ved through a
correction-of error-standard. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah
App. 1997). However, a court can only overturn the factual finding of proper service if
the district court's findings were "without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law." FVestern Capital & Sec. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989, 991
(Utah App.), cert. denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). Further, "[f]indings of fact are not
clearly erroneous unless they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
21

Mindful of due process rights, Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(A) expressly authorizes
service by publication only.
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding
service of process, the party seeking service of process may file a motion
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication ....
·while citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct.
652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950), which considered whether service by publication violates a
defendant's due process rights, Defendant ignores Utah case law directly on point, which
applies Mullane in the specific context of Utah's Rule 4(d)(4)(A). In Jackson Const.
Co., Inc. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, ~ 11, 100 P.3d 1211, 1215, the Utah Supreme Court
made clear that Utah courts satisfy the due process concerns outlined in Mullane by first
requiring a plaintiff to exercise reasonable due diligence in attempting to locate and serve
a defendant before alternative service by publication may be sought or allowed. The
Jackson Court stated:
Under this rule, litigants may not resort to service by publication until they have
first undertaken reasonably diligent efforts to locate the party to be served. This
reasonable diligence requirement arises from constitutional due process rights and
the recognition that publication alone is generally not a reliable means of
informing interested parties that their rights are at issue before the court.
Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652,
94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). The Jackson Court emphasized, however, that "[t]he reasonable
diligence standard does not require a plaintiff to 'exhaust all possibilities' to locate and
the evidence." Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraenier, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ~ 11, 210
P.3d 263. Therefore, this Court not only must find that the District Court abused its
discretion or it must correct an error in the District Court's ruling, but also must conclude
that its underlying actual findings of proper service were clearly erroneous.
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serve a defendant.'' Jackson, 1 19 (quoting DoVi 7ney State Bank v. A1ajor-Blaken.ey Corp.,
545 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976), overruled in part on other grounds by Mgmt. Sen·s. v.

Dev. Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980)). This standard only requires that a "means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might
reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. Other jurisdictions similarly recognize that "a
plaintiff need not exhaust all conceivable means of personal service before service by
publication is authorized." .McComb v. Aboelessad, 535 N.W.2d 744, 748 (N.D. 1995)

(citing Carson v. 1\Torthstar Development Co., 62 \\Tash. App. 310, 814 P.2d 217,221
(1991 )). The .McComb court explained: "Rather, reasonable efforts under the
circumstances are all that is required." Id. (citing ..~1ullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 70 S. Ct. at
658); United Nat'/ Bank v. Searles, 331 N.W.2d 288, 292 (S.D.1983)). Importantly, Utah
law recognizes the realities facing a process server, observing,
personal service should not become a "degrading game of wiles and tricks" nor
should a defendant be able to defeat service simply by refusing to accept the
papers or instructing others, suitable under the rules of civil procedure, also to
reject service.

Wood v. T¥eenig, 736 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 1987).
The Jackson case thus establishes the minimum requirement for reasonable
diligence. Specifically, the Court held plaintiff's actions were insufficient where he only
obtained a single California address for both defendants from a recorder and sent a letter
addressed to that California address that was returned as "undeliverable." Jackson, ~21.
Finding this attempt insufficient, the Court reasoned plaintiff could have taken other
steps, such as "consulting a telephone directory or by contacting a resident of Washington
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County, who was [defendants'] cotenant before [plaintiff] acquired its interest in the
property." Id. These few simple, additional actions would have provided reasonable
diligence in plaintiff's attempts to serve the defendant. Id. (emphasis added).
As applied herein, the foregoing authorities support the conclusion that the District
Court neither made a clear en-or in its findings, nor abused its discretion in denying
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside.

A.

Plaintiff Was Reasonably Diligent In Attempting To Serve Defendant
And Had Good Cause To Believe Defendant \Vas Avoiding Service.

Plaintiff "diligent!y" and reasonably attempted to serve Defendant at her known
residence, through at least five separate service attempts as referenced, supra, and came
to believe based on "good cause" that Defendant was "avoiding service". Nevertheless,
in satisfaction of Defendant's due process interests, only up_on Plaintiff's proof of such
(by undisputed and admissible evidence) did the District Court exercise its discretion to
allow Plaintiff to serve Defendant alternatively via publication.
Plaintiff's evidence included the sworn testimony of a disinterested and qualified
process server, Mr. Dyches, who diligently attempted to serve Defendant, on at least five
separate days, at different times (mid-morning to evening), over a period of nearly 3
weeks. See Facts, ~'if 14-20, supra. Despite Plaintiff's efforts, Defendant refused to
accept personal service. During these visits, Mr. Dyches independently verified
Defendant still lived at the address he had been given by Plaintiff, by speaking with
neighbors during two of his visits. As evidenced by the Declaration of Staci RobisonReith, Plaintiff also verified, through an updated internet search, that it had Defendant's
24

correct address. Mr. Dyches also observed that a note left on the doorstep of Defendant's
Residence was addressed to Defendant, further confirming Defendant resided there.
Dwi.ng one visit, :Mr. Dyches even left his business card at Defendant's door to facilitate
a phone or in person contact with Defendant. During another service attempt, Mr.
Dyches observed that a man at Defendant's Residence waited until he was driving away
before coming out of the residence to get the mail. During two of his service attempts,

:tv'rr. Dyches observed not only that people \\ ere home, but also that he made visual
7

contact with one or more of them, further evidencing their intentional refusal to .ans\ver
the door. During his last visit and despite :M:r. Dyches shouting directly at a man in the
office through an open front door, knocking loudly and ringing the doorbell, the adult
resident utterly ignored him and persisted in avoiding Plaintiff's attempted service.
Consistent with the foregoing avoidance of service, when Mr. Dyches returned from
reconfirming Defendant's address with a neighbor, someone in Defendant's Residence
had closed the office blinds and shut the opened front door. Finally, Plaintiff also sent a
certified letter to the address, which Defendant refused to accept and which was returned
unclaimed.
Applying Rule 4(d)(4)(A) strictly, the District Court weighed this evidence and in
its sound discretion allowed alternative service via publication as expressly authorized by
the rules of procedure. According to the District Court, these undisputed facts
established that (1) Plaintiff "diligently" attempted to serve Defendant at her known
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residence, and (2) had "good cause" to believe that Defendant was "avoiding service". R.
61-62.
Significantly, pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside (and considering the
opposing arguments of Defendant, which were not previously before the Court), the
Court carefully reconsidered its Amended Order and the basis for such. Unwilling to
allow Plaintiffs good faith attempts of personal service to "become a 'degrading game of
wiles and tricks"' (Wood, 736 P.2d at 1055), the District Court thoughtfully stated:
But I will tell you that having rereviewed the affidavits, rereviewed what I did in
the first instance in authorizing the service by publication, I would do it the same
way. I'm satisfied that based upon the affidavit that was presented to me that there
was sufficient evidence to justify alternative service.
R. 03 72. The District Court thereby reiterated its earlier determinations, inter alia, that
"Defendant has avoided personal service and there are no other means to personally
serve Defendant" and "good cause [exists] to believe that the persons to be served are
avoiding service of process, and service by normal means is unreasonable and
impracticable under the circumstances." R. 61-62. Having applied the law in a wellreasoned, deliberate and reasonable manner given the record evidence, the District
Court neither made clearly erroneous findings, nor misapplied the law, under the
circumstances.
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B.

Senice By Publication Not Only ,vas a Reasonable l\ieans of
Informing Defendant, But .Also ,vas Expressly Authorized By The
Rules.

Service bv
publication is explicitly
form of
.,., . authorized as a valid and acceptable
alternative service. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(A). The Utah Legislature, like legislatures
across the country, has explicitly legislated that publication is a valid and authorized
means of providing notice regarding a variety of legal rights and proceedings. In
addition to the service of lawsuits (where, as here, the propriety of such is reviewed and
found appropriate by a court under Utah law), service or notice by publication is
explicitly recognized as a common and acceptable fon11 of providing notice of tax sales,
notice to creditors of an estate, notice for judicial and non-judicial foreclosures and the
like. Such notice has not been the basis to void all or portions of such proceedings,
which involve basic property and related rights.
:Moreover, under these circumstances, publication through a newspaper was a
likely means to inform Defendant of the lawsuit. Defendant's position that alte1native
sen1ice by publication was not calculated to provide her notice is disingenuous.
Ironically, Defendant was a tax sale interest purchaser of the property at issue in the
underlying case. R. 345; see Facts, ,r 2. Defendant's counsel has acknowledged that
Defendant "bought [her undivided 40% interest in the property] at the tax sale, because
those are noticed by the county .... " R. 0345. Utah County states on its website, and it
is commonly known, that notices of tax sales are posted in the newspaper, including the
very newspaper through which Plaintiff published its service upon Defendant, The Daily
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Herald. See Utah Code 59-2-1351(2) (directing tax sales are to be noticed in the
newspaper published in that county); http://www.utahcounty.Q:ov/taxsale/index.html
("Public notices will be published in either The Daily Herald, Deseret News, or Salt Lake
Tribune starting 4 weeks prior to the sale."). Given this information, Defendant's historic
dealings with notices by publication and the reasonable inference from Defendant's
counsel's record statement, Defendant was likely to check the newspaper, as she
impliedly did when she received notice of the tax sale, whereby she purchased the
underlying property interest in the first place. These circumstances provide useful
context and additional considerations that, in furtherance of Plaintiffs reasonable
diligence and good cause belief that Defendant was avoiding service, demonstrate service
by publication was reasonably fashioned to accomplish the objective of notifying
Defendant of the lawsuit.

In sum, Defendant was properly served in accordance with appropriate due
process considerations and as expressly authorized by Rule 4(d)(4)(A) under the
circumstances. 2 Based on undisputed evidence of Plaintiff's diligent efforts and
Defendant's avoidance of service, the District Court soundly exercised its discretion in
permitting Plaintiff to serve Defendant through publication, the requirements with which

2

The District Court, at the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside, recognized Plaintiff's
diligent efforts and Defendant's avoidance of service. Judge Taylor found in denying the
Motion to Set Aside, that "[t]he process server didn't merely knock on the door five times
and say nobody is there. He checked with neighbors, he saw people moving around.....
He had reason to believe there were people there that were refusing to respond to him."
R. 0372.
28

Plaintiff strictly complied. Moreover, the District Court neither made clearly erroneous
findings, nor misapplied the law, in denying the Motion to Set Aside.

III.

ARGUENDO, SHOULD THE COURT CONSIDER DEFE:NDA....NT'S

,..\LLEGED l\1ERITORIOUS DEFENSE, DEFENDA,.~T'S ARGUlVIB:STS
ARE u"NSUPPORTED.
Arguendo, should the Court consider Defendant's alleged meritorious defense

respecting the underlying default judgment (i.e., though such was not presen,ed and is
outside Rule 60(b)(4) and the scope of this appeal, as noted, supra), Defendant's
arguments do not establish a valid or meritorious defense for several reasons.
First, Defendant's statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of
the statute. Regarding statutory construction, the Utah Supreme Court has observed:
The best evidence of the legislature's intent is "the plain language of the statute
itself. Thus, [w ]hen interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary
indication, that the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary
and usually accepted meaning. Additionally, we presume[] that the expression of
one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another. \Ve therefore seek to
give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all omissions to be
purposeful.
A1arion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,I 14,267 P.3d 863 (citing O'Dea
v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ,I 32, 217 P .3d 704; Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer,

LLC, 2009 UT 7,

~

73, 210 P.3d 263; State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54,

~

13, 165 P.3d

1206.) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
Utah's Partial Interest Tax Purchaser statute mandates that a person who purchases
an undivided interest of less than 49% at a tax sale "may not object" to a subsequent sale
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by the majority property owner. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-13 51. 7. This statutory
directive is clear, plain and unambiguous.
Second, consistent with principles of statutory construction, the foregoing mandate
is internally consistent with the rest of the relevant statutory language. Foutz v. City of S.

Jordan, 2004 UT 75, if 11, 100 P.3d 1171 ("We read the plain language of the statute as a
whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters. . . . We strive to construe statutes in a manner that renders 'all parts
thereof relevant and meaningful."') (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ~ 17, 66 P.3d
592) and Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)).
Nowhere in the statute does it provide, expressly or impliedly, that a minority
owner can object, including if he/she thinks the purchase price is too low, is too high, is
not at market price, is untimely, or that the property has not been properly sold, or for any
other of a myriad reasons. Thus, the legislature's presumptively advised inclusion of the
phrase "may not object" can only be properly construed to the exclusion of any
interpretation to the contrary, including giving a purchaser the right to challenge the fair
market value or other terms of such subsequent sale.
Indeed, consistent with the majority owner's unconditional right to sell the
property as and when he/she chooses, the statute also contains the following explicit
guarantee respecting the tax sale interest purchaser interest in the proceeds of sale from
property:
(2) [the] tax sale interest purchaser may only receive from the sale of the tax sale
property, an amount equal to the greater of:
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(a) The amount the tax sale interest purchaser paid for the undivided interest in
the tax sale property at the tax sale plus 12% interest; or

(b) The tax sale jnterest purchaser's pro rata share of the sale price of the tax
sale property based on the percentage of the undivided interest the tax sale
interest purchaser holds in the tax sale property.
(3) A tax sale interest purchase mav not object to the sale of the tax sale property
if the tax sale interest purchaser receives an amount in accordance ,:vitJ.1 Subsection
(2).

Id. at§ 59-2-1351.7(2) (emphasis added). This language provides an explicit safeguard
or guarantee for the tax sale interest purchaser's investment. 3 The tax sale interest
purchaser is guaranteed at least a 12 % return, regardless of any subsequent sale price for
the property. The plain language of the statute thus ensures that though a tax sale interest
purchaser "may not object to the sale", a safeguard exists to protect him/her from the loss
of his purchase price or investment on resale of the property. Thus, the mandate of
disallowing any objection and simultaneous guaranteeing a minimum return to a minority
owner are harmonized in the statute. Such is also consistent with the public policy of
encouraging people to purchase tax sale property interests (which facilitates the taxing
authority's primary objective of expeditiously liquidating properties to satisfy tax
obligations and timely raise needed tax revenues).
Third, Utah law is clear that it is not the role of the judiciary to write, or indeed,
rewrite Utah law. State v. Anderson, 1007 UT App 304, ii 11, 169 P.3d 778 ("Moreover,
3

Clearly, the safeguard the legislature chose to include in the statute reduces, if not
entirely eliminates, sale related complications, lawsuits, challenges and disputes,
including whether the majority interest owner sold the property on terms that satisfy the
minority tax sale interest purchaser.
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' [o]ur task is to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to correct or revise them.
Vvhen the words are clear, however incongruous they may appear in policy application,
we will interpret them as written, leaving to the legislature the task of making corrections
when warranted."' (quoting State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ,I 9, 150 PJd 540));

Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 94 7 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) ("The judiciary is
4

obligated to interpret statutes as they are crafted, not to redesign them."). Rather, courts
are to interpret statutory language so as to give meaning to the entirety thereof and in
accordance with the plain terms thereof without either adding to or detracting from the
plain meaning thereof. Anderson, ("When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain
language to detennine its meaning. . . . . "\Vhile examining a statute's plain language, we
do so under the presumption that the "legislature used each term advisedly." (citing Utah

State Tax Conini'n v. Stevenson, 2006 UT 84, ,I 32, 150 P.3d 521; State v. Maestas, 2002
UT 123, ,I 52, 63 P.3d 621).
In this case, the majority interest owner sold the property and offered Defendant
40% of the purchase price of the property, which exceeded the statutorily guaranteed
12% return on her investlnent. This satisfied the plain terms of statute.

4

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 1~ Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 502,505, 155 P.2d 184,
185 (1945) ("We therefore address ourselves to its meaning, keeping in mind one of the
cardinal rules of statutory construction, viz., that the interpretation must be based on the
language used, and that the court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to
an intention not expressed. 'The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so that the act
read by itself, or in connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject, is clear,
certain and unambiguous, the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the
law according to its terms."' (internal citations omitted)).
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Fomth, that market value is plainly not a factor in the initial tax sale or in any
subsequent sale is not surprising, as the legislature and taxing authority are not concerned
with obtaining the highest value possible for a foreclosed property; rather~ it is interested
in quickly liquidating a tax debt. For this reason, the minority tax sale interest purchaser
presumably acquires the property interest at a distressed sale and/or for less than fair
market value. Had the legislature wished to make fair market value a detennining factor
in either the initial or any subsequent sale of such properties, it certainly could have
included such language. Clearly, it did not do so. Defendant's attempt to write into the
statute ne,v, additional or contradictory terms is at odds ,vith the plain language thereof
and the manifest intent of the legislature.

Arguendo, even assuming Defendant's interpretation of the statute, Defendant's
further assertions regarding the value of the property and the circumstances of the sale are
not factually supported by the record. As this defense was not properly raised or
preserved below, issues regarding the value of the property are not part of the record.
Even Defendant's conclusory value assertions (i.e., that the value of the property was
$140,000) in her Reply :Memorandum were unverified and inadmissible and must be
disregarded on appeal (as in the District Court). The record does, hmvever, necessarily
reflect that Defendant paid only $5,070 for a 40% interest in the property (regardless that
such is presumably at a below fair market value). This established the amount of
Defendant's investment for purposes of Utah's Partial Interest Tax Purchaser, and
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significantly, demonstrates Plaintiffs compliance therewith. 5 Defendant's arguments
notwithstanding, no meritorious defense can be said to exist based on the record.
Defendant's alleged defense is based on conjecture and speculation. Defendant
cites no law in support; rather, offers mere assumptions not supported by the record, upon
which she urges this Court io rewrite the plain language of tax sale purchaser statute.
~--~
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~ot e,videri~e and her-introduction of new and/or additional

words or concepts into the statute has the effect of contradicting, expanding and/ or
modifying the plain meaning and scope thereof.
In sum, to establish an alleged meritorious defense regarding the underlying
default judgment, Defendant necessarily urges the Court to construe and interpret the
statute in a manner that is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language thereof. Her
variously urged and requisite factual assumptions are likewise based on conjecture,
speculation and information parol to the statute. Likewise, her so-called equitable
considerations are unsupported in the record and are hardly equitable under the
circumstances. The District Court correctly and wisely disregarded such in denying the
Motion to Set Aside. As such, arguendo, even if her alleged defense were considered,
Defendant cannot establish a meritorious defense.
The District Court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside should be affnn1ed.
5

Ironically, by Defendant's reasoning, Defendant's alleged "equitable" defense is based
on Defendant's purchase for $5,070 of a 40% interest in the property she claims to be
worth $56,000. This equitable argument is untenable. Likewise, Defendant's accusation
that Plaintiff has, directly or indirectly, engaged in "laundering" the property is frivolous,
speculative and unsupported factually and legally. Such arguments cannot be considered.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff urges this Court to affirm the District Court's
August 21 ~ 2015 Order Denying Motion for Relief from Default Judgment.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of :tv1ay, 2016.
DlJRH~M JONES

PIJ\TEGAR

~~-~~
Vvm. Kelly Nash
Kimberly N. Baum
Attorneys for Appellee
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